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The disruption afflicting the modern world is a ‘perfect storm’, combining a deadly and 
highly infectious virus, a global economic recession, the erosion of global governance and the 
failure to coordinate a coordinated global response. This was not a ‘black swan’ event, 
something unpredictable but with enormous ramifications, but a ‘grey rhino’, something that 
had been both predictable and predicted. The devastating effect of the Covid-19 coronavirus 
pandemic is magnified by its specific characteristics, including ease of transfer, delay in the 
appearance of symptoms, lethality, and the lack of vaccines and adequate testing facilities.  
 
The crisis turned into a moment of truth, in which the presumptions, prejudices and processes 
of the post-Cold War era were exposed in a harsh light. The Covid-19 pandemic accelerated 
long-term changes and exposed some underlying truths about our societies and pattern of 
international relations. No new global and regional balance of power will emerge as a result 
of the pandemic. However, trends that have already been visible for some time will emerge 
with greater clarity.  
 
The crisis once again brought the nation state to the centre of social life, as the only force 
with the power and resources to deal with the epidemiological and health consequences as 
well as the management of populations and economies. By the same token, the crisis revealed 
the weakness of certain states, with low trust between the centre and the regions and the 
inadequacy of public health and welfare provision. Other states, with a healthy relationship 
between the central government and the regions and between state and society, emerged with 
great credit.  
 
In other words, the crisis was a test not only for states and the instruments of international 
governance, but also for types of state management. Countries with extended welfare state 
tended to manage the pandemic better than in those with fragmented and financialised health 
systems. There was no immediate correlation between crisis performance and regime type. In 
other words, the measure was not so much democracy or authoritarianism, but state capacity 
and leadership competence. 
 
The crisis also highlighted the importance of international cooperation agencies. The G-7 
once again proved itself too narrow a body to have a significant impact on managing the 
crisis, while the G-20 group was unable to assume the leadership role that it had done 
following the financial collapse of autumn 2008. No new balance between nationalism and 
multilateralism is apparent. Instead, the weakness of global governance in the present era has 
become all too clear.  
 
The conduct of international politics has become even more state-centred than before. 
Globalisation had earlier suggested that certain economic imperatives transcend state 
policies. However, when urgent action was required it was the state that acted. The problems 
may well have been global in scale, but national responses were crucial. The importance of 
national welfare and health provision was reinforced, which years of austerity since the 
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economic crisis of 2008-09 followed by the Eurozone crisis of 2011 had reduced to a parlous 
state in a number of European countries.  
 
Responses to the Great Pandemic became a new proxy for measurement of the adequacy of 
government, with the US scoring badly, while China’s early mismanagement of the health 
crisis amidst attempts to suppress information was offset by the timely sharing of the genetic 
structure of the novel virus and resolute action to suppress its spread. In Germany the 
combination of effective central policy, strong federal governance and high societal trust 
mitigated the crisis, throwing into stark light the absence in the US of an inclusive public 
health care system and social safety net.  
 
The pandemic accelerated the decline in influence of both the United States and Europe. The 
crucial role of multilateral agencies and problem sharing was demonstrated, but long-standing 
American ambivalence about global governance institutions was taken to a wholly new level. 
At the height of the crisis the Trump administration even withdrew funding from the UN’s 
World Health Organisation. However, it soon became clear no country, even one as powerful 
as the US, could deal with the crisis and its various economic, health and social ramifications 
in isolation. 
 
The already visible tendencies towards deglobalisation intensified, accompanied by a 
repudiation of the some of the universalism of the liberal global order. This was accompanied 
by a strengthening of anti-democratic trends, isolationism and growth in the appetite for 
strong hand authoritarianism. There were also counter-trends, with the EU hosting a donors’ 
conference on 4 April 2020 to gain funds for vaccine research and dissemination, and in 
many countries opposed political forces cooperated to provide bipartisan support for public 
health responses. 
 
The pandemic struck at a time when the balance of forces and ideological commitments was 
already in flux. There is an intensifying crisis of world order marked by the re-emergence of 
great power conflict and a nascent return to a bipolar structure to international politics, with 
the US and its allies on the one side, and China and those who align with it on the other.  
 
Trump’s rejection of the universalism of the liberal order, as well as its hubristic 
‘humanitarian’ and regime change interventions, was welcomed by many as an essential 
rebalancing of US foreign policy towards greater concern for domestic development. 
However, this is accompanied by the exacerbation of long-term conflicts. This in particular 
concerns relations with China. The trade war launched in late 2018 was resolved in early 
2020 with the signing of part one of a deal. However, as the US was gripped by the most 
extensive outbreak of the pandemic, accompanied by a high death toll, Trump’s early 
nonchalance about the virus came to haunt him. The crisis magnified and exposed the 
drawbacks of his governance style and the larger failings of the American healthcare and 
crisis management system. Attention turned to China, blaming it not only for early failings to 
get to grips with the outbreak in Wuhan, but then seeking reparations for the enormous 
damage the crisis caused to the US and global economy. 
 
Even before that Russia had been subject to escalating sanctions, with the latest imposed 
against the completion of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea to Germany. 
Despite Trump proclaiming in 2016 that it made sense to ‘get on’ with Russia, the allegations 
of Russian electoral interference stymied moves towards rapprochement. Trump’s friendly 
words towards Putin may have been motivated by a grudging respect for his power, but above 
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all by the strategic goal of peeling Russia away from alignment with China. This alignment 
has been developing since the 1990s but greatly accelerated after 2014 and the onset of the 
Second Cold War. There is no chance of Trump achieving a Kissingerian manoeuvre in 
reverse, and winning Russia (rather than China) over to the US side. 
 
There is no reason to expect a new ‘reset’ in relations between Russia and the US. The long-
term deterioration in relations was interspersed by periods of co-operation, as after the 
September 2001 attack on the US. The crisis provided an opportunity to reset ties. Trump is a 
transactional president who favours great power deals and personal relations, so the Great 
Pandemic provided scope for a new opening. There were more telephone calls between Putin 
and Trump in spring 2020 than in the whole previous period of his presidency. However, 
Trump’s room for manoeuvre to strike a ‘grand bargain’ is extremely limited. The Democrats 
in Congress are resolutely opposed to any concessions to Russia, and a large part of the 
traditional Republican Party does not share Trump’s view that Russia is a potential ally in the 
struggle against China.  
 
This means nothing less than the division of the world into two opposing poles. However, the 
new version of bipolarity has little in common with the one that predominated in the First 
Cold War between 1945 and 1990. The international system is far more integrated and has 
created a single global multilateral governance regime. There is also now a single global 
market economy and extensive supply chain economic interdependence. Today the two poles 
are deeply entwined. However, rather than diminishing conflict, this may well only provide 
new terrain in which the struggle can be waged – through sanctions, financial pressure and 
the like.  
 
The crisis proved a stress test for the deepening Sino-Russian relationship. As the outbreak in 
Wuhan spiralled into a global pandemic, Russia closed the border on 31 January. Later, 
Russia became one of the main sources of renewed infection as Chinese citizens returned 
home. However, Russia is one of the few countries which stand firmly with China. The 
foreign minister Sergei Lavrov argues that calls for China to pay compensation were 
‘unacceptable and shocking’. In a call with Xi Jinping on 16 April Vladimir Putin condemned 
as ‘counterproductive’ criticism that China did not act fast enough to contain the pandemic. 
He argued that the crisis served as ‘further evidence of the special nature of the Russian-
Chinese comprehensive strategic partnership’. China came to Russia’s rescue as oil prices 
plunged and producers looked to dump surplus output. China’s imports of Russian crude 
increased and threw a lifeline to Russian companies hit by falling demand in a Europe. The 
Great Pandemic demonstrated to both Moscow and Beijing the strategic importance of a 
common front in the face of shared challenges.  
 
The Great Pandemic highlighted the need for multilateral cooperation and the strengthening 
of the international organisations dealing with its consequences, but the trend was towards the 
‘renationalisation’ of international politics. While there were cooperative initiatives, above all 
centred on the EU, the crisis exacerbated and deepened existing tensions. There is little sign 
of the pandemic bringing nations together.  
 
The Great Pandemic reinforced the weakness of international governance, the primacy of 
state action, the entrenched character of great power rivalries, and the overall impasse in post-
Cold War international politics. However enormous the social and economic effects of the 
Great Pandemic, in terms of international politics all that it has done is demonstrate the 
problems rather than opening a path towards their resolution.  
